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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 1996, Governor Chiles signed into law Committee Substitute for Senate Bills 2290 and 2288 (CS/SBs 2290 & 2288) which
represents the most comprehensive revision to Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) since its adoption in 1974.' This legislation,
which became effective on October 1, 1996,2 is intended to usher in a
new era in the way state government does business with its citizens.
CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 garnered significant bipartisan support during the
legislative process and was supported and lobbied by the business
community.3 Many of the substantive changes to the APA included in
the bill were developed during the previous two legislative sessions and
refined by the Governor's APA Review Commission during the period
preceding the 1996 Regular Session.4
This Article focuses on the new limits on policymaking by state
agencies through adjudication rather than rulemaking. Part II discusses
the judicial decisions and statutory provisions related to "incipient
agency policymaking" which served as background for the 1996
legislation. Part HI briefly discusses recent legislative attempts to
enhance agency accountability by restricting policymaking by adjudication, as well as the work of the Governor's APA Review Commission
on this issue prior to the 1996 Regular Session. Finally, Part IV analyzes
the provisions of the 1996 legislation which may further restrict the
ability of agencies to rely on "incipient policies," "agency statements,"
or "unadopted rules" in determining the substantial interests of regulated
persons.

1. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, at 147.
2. Id. § 44.
3. Senate Bill 2290 was sponsored by Democratic Senator Charles Williams. Senate Bill
2288, which included many of the same provisions as Senate Bill 2290, and which was
combined with Senate Bill 2290 during the committee process, was sponsored by Democratic
Senator Rick Dantzler and Republican Senator Locke Burt. The House companion bill, House
Bill 1179, was sponsored by Republican Representative Ken Pruitt. Another measure of the bill's

bipartisan support is its unanimous passage by both the House and Senate. For an in-depth
discussion of the legislative history of CS/SBs 2290 & 2288, see James P. Rhea & Patrick L.
"Booter" Imhof, An Overview of the 1996 Administrative ProcedureAct, 48 FLA. L. REV. 1
(1996).
4. See Fla. CS/HB 237 (1994); Fla. CS/CS/SB 536 (1995); A Symposium of the Florida
Administrative ProcedureAct, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243-368 (1994). For a discussion of the
Commission's recommendations, see generally GOVERNOR'S ADMIN. PRoc. AcT REV. COMM'N,
FINAL REPORT 1-5 (Feb. 20, 1996) [hereinafter APA COMM'N REPORT].
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II. BACKGROUND AND OvERvIEw

A. McDonald Coins a New Phrase:
"IncipientAgency Policy"
It has been almost twenty years since the First District Court of
Appeal's decision in McDonald v. Department of Banking & Finance'
held that state agencies are not required to adopt all of their emerging
or "incipient" policies as rules.6 The court reasoned that agencies may
choose not to adopt those policies as rules but rather explain, support
and defend such policies in each case in which the policy is applied.7
Because an agency that chooses to develop a policy through adjudication
must "prove up" the policy in each proceeding in which it is applied,
there must be adequate support for the policy in the record of the
proceeding In this regard, the agency must provide sufficient evidence
for the hearing officer to determine that the agency has adequately
explained the basis for its non-rule policy, and that the policy is within
its delegated authority.9
The agency may reject the hearing officer's determination in its final
order." If the agency does so, it has a duty to explain the nonrule
policy and to "address countervailing arguments developed in the record
as well as those urged by the hearing officer's recommended order."'"
However, because a reviewing court must give more weight to the
agency's substituted findings when they are infused with policy
considerations within the agency's area of expertise, agencies are
relatively free to reject the hearing officer's determination as to the
validity of the nonrule policy so long as there is some basis in the
record to support its policy decision.'"
5. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
6. Id. at 580.
7. Id. at 582.

8. Id.; Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Sere. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281
(Fla. 1980); Gason v. Department of Admin., 554 So. 2d 516, 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989);
Anheuser-Busch v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
9. Barker v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 428 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);
Department of Revenue v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 388 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (Ervin,
J., specifically concurring); White Adver. Int'l v. Department of Transp., 368 So. 2d 411, 413
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Ervin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10. Doctors' Osteopathic Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 498
So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
11. Id.
12. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 579; see also FLA.STAT. § 120.68(10) (1995).

13. See Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1182. The agency must create the record and
establish the facts at the hearing upon which it intends to rely as a basis for its non-rule policy.
Id. at 1182-83.
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By contrast, a hearing officer's determination as to the invalidity of
a proposed or existing agency rule is binding on the agency because
hearing officers have "final order authority" in rule challenge proceedings. 14 The amendments in CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 address this apparent
inconsistency in legislative policy. While the bill does not cloak the
hearing officer's determination as to the validity of the agency's nonrule
policy with "final order authority," the bill does restrict the agency's
ability to reject the hearing officer's determination in the agency's final
order. 5
In order to give agencies more flexibility in developing their
policies, 6 McDonald created an exception to the general rule that the
formal rulemaking process, with its attendant notice and public hearing
requirements, must be used to develop policies that implement delegated
legislative authority.'7 Unfortunately, as the late Florida State University Professor Pat Dore noted, "[b]efore long,... the limited McDonald
exception swallowed the rule," because courts "allowed the agencies
themselves to decide whether and when they were ready to proceed to
rulemaking."' 8 This reliance on adjudication instead of rulemaking to
announce agency policies threatened the return of the "phantom
government"' 9 and set the stage for the enactment of section 120.535.

14. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4)(d), .56(5) (1995).
15. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)3.
(Supp. 1996)). The determination as to the validity of the non-rule policy is typically made
during the course of a § 120.57 hearing where final agency action is technically still being
formulated. See discussion infra pt. IV.C.
16. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583 (stating "Itihe court's responsibility is to allow the
agency full statutory range for its putative expertise and specialized experience").
17. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
18. Patricia A. Dore,. Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative
Adjudicationand Requires Indexing andAvailability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
437, 437 (1991). As recently as 1991, the First District Court of Appeal opined that:
"Rulemaking cannot be forced upon an agency[,] and its policy may be developed, at the
agency's choice, through the adjudication of individual cases." Florida League of Cities v.
Administration Comm'n, 586 So. 2d 397, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Rabren v.
Department of Prof'l Reg., 568 So. 2d 1283, 1289 (Fla. Ist DCA 1990) (stating "[b]y now it is
well established that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication is largely left to the
agency").
19. "Phantom government" refers to the perception that if agency policies are not formally
adopted as rules and thereby made known to the regulated community and the public at large,
not only are agency decisions unpredictable but also there is no means to determine whether the
policies are being consistently applied in accordance with legislative intent. See APA COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss1/3

4

Hopping and Wetherell: The Legislature Tweaks McDonald (Again): The New Restrictions on
NEW RESTRICTIONS INAPA

B. Section 120.535, FloridaStatutes: The FirstAttack on
(or Refinement of) Incipient Agency Policymaking
McDonald has been hailed by some for the flexibility it grants
agencies to develop their emerging policies on a case-by-case basis,"
but it has been cursed by others because of a perception that it grants
agencies too much flexibility in this regard.2 Perhaps foreshadowing
this criticism, the McDonald court reasoned that agencies would choose
to adopt their policies as rules once they were fully developed to relieve
themselves of the burden of defending the policies in each case in which
the policy is applied.2 The court further reasoned that since the
agency's nonrule policy would appear and be explained in the agency's
final order, judicial review of those policies under section 120.68 also
would induce agencies to adopt their policies as rules. 3
Neither of these incentives proved to be effective, and agencies
frequently relied on case-by-case adjudication to announce policy in lieu
of the formal rulemaking process.24 Thus, in 1991, the Legislature
enacted Florida Statutes section 120.535 to mandate the agency action
that the McDonaldcourt had incorrectly predicted would naturally flow
from the inducements it provided.' Section 120.535(1) for the first
time clearly provided that "[r]ulemaking is not a matter of agency
discretion."26 It further required agencies to adopt their policies through
rulemaking as soon as "feasible" and "practicable." 7
The burden to prove that rulemaking is not "feasible" or "practicable" is on the agency. 8 To meet this burden, the agency must effectively demonstrate that the policy is, in fact, incipient or evolving.2 9 In

20. See, e.g., George L. Waas, Policy Making Under the FloridaAdministrative Procedure
Act, 54 FLA. B.J. 209 (Mar. 1980).
21. This latter sentiment was captured by Professor Dore when she stated, "[w]hat started
out as a justifiable exception for 'incipient' policy ... has become, over the years, a licensefor
agencies to avoid rulemakingby exercising their unbridled discretion to do so." Dore, supra note
18, at 448 (emphasis added).
22. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 582-83.
23. Id. at 583.
24. See Eric T. Olsen, Required Rulemaking Under Florida's APA: An Analysis of
"Feasible" and "Practicable,"67 FLA. B.J. 62, 62 (Aug. 1993); see also Johnny C. Burris, The
Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process to Provide Effective Incentives for Agency
Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 661, 678 (1991); Dore, supra note 18, at 448.
25. FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995); Olsen, supra note 24, at 62.
26. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 120.535(1)(a)-(b). However, the person challenging the statement has the initial
burden of demonstrating that the statement meets the definition of a rule in § 120.52(16), and
that it has not been formally adopted through the rulemaking process. Id. § 120.535(2)(a)2.-3.
29. Christo v. Department of Banking & Fin., 649 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
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this regard, section 120.535 ensures that only "true" incipient agency
policy is unadopted.3 All other agency statements must be formally
adopted through the rulemaking process.31 Agencies are not foreclosed
from developing their policies through adjudication.32 Once developed,
however, section 120.535 affirmatively requires the policies to be
adopted through rulemaking.
Along with section 120.535, the 1991 Legislature also enacted
section 120.57(1)(b)15. 33 The latter section specifically authorizes
agencies to rely on nonrule policy in determining a person's substantial
interests so long as the agency "proves up" the policy each time it is
applied. 34 An agency may rely on this nonrule policy even if is being
challenged under section 120.535, or if it has been determined to violate
section 120.535(1), so long as the agency has initiated the rulemaking
process to formally adopt the policy.3
When viewed in this manner, section 120.535 arguably did little
more than codify the McDonald decision. 36 The inquiry as to whether
rulemaking is "feasible" and "practicable" essentially asks whether the
agency's policy still "incipient. '37 A person who prevails in a proceeding under section 120.535 has merely shown that the agency has
"solidified its position on [the] policy" and therefore must adopt the
policy through the rulemaking process. 38 Because the agency may
continue to rely on the statement in subsequent adjudicatory proceedings
during the rulemaking process, 39 an agency is not "penalized" for not
having initiated formal rulemaking as soon as it "should have."
As a result, one commentator noted that the remedies provided by
section 120.535 are incomplete, at best.' Accordingly, there have been
very few appellate decisions construing section 120.535 and less

30. Id.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995).
32. See Christo, 649 So. 2d at 320.
33. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-30, § 4, at 246-49 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1995)).
34. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15. (1995).
35. Id. § 120.535(5); but see Department of Revenue v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252,
255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (stating that an unpromulgated rule is not enforceable absent.
promulgation in accordance with § 120.54 (citing Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield
Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991))).
36. See Dore, supra note 18, at 448.
37. See Christo, 649 So. 2d at 320; FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1995).
38. Christo, 649 So. 2d at 320; see also Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d at 255.
39. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(5) (1995).
40. Steven T. Maher, Administrative Procedure Act Amendments: The 1991 and 1992
Amendments to the FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 367, 399,
402-03 (1992) ("[Slection 120.535 proceedings may not be worthwhile unless they are part of
a larger administrative litigation strategy.").
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administrative litigation than expected." Another explanation for this
fact is that a prevailing party is not entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees and costs under section 120.535.42 Attorneys' fees are recoverable
only where an agency statement or policy previously determined to
violate section 120.535(1) is relied on by the agency to determine a
person's substantial interests and the agency has not initiated the
rulemaking process to formally adopt the policy.43 The Legislature
purported to address each of these perceived deficiencies in section
120.535 as part of the 1996 legislation.'
C. From Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, to
"The Rule of Common Sense"
Section 120.535, like McDonald, was hailed by some and cursed by
others. Its supporters argue that section 120.535 serves as a check on
"incipient policymaking" by agencies and requires each agency policy
to undergo more meaningful review through the rulemaking process.4
Those who oppose section 120.535 argue that it mandates unnecessary
agency rulemaking and prevents agency personnel from making
decisions based upon common sense or equity.46
For the past several years, Governor Chiles has been an outspoken
critic of section 120.535 and has called for its repeal. In his 1995
"State of the State" address to the Legislature, the Governor identified
the morass of rules and regulations in Florida as "Public Enemy Number
One" and specifically targeted section 120.535 as follows:
Current law requires that any state agency charged with
carrying out a statutory function must adopt rules and
regulations, whether they're needed or not. This statute,
120.535, should be repealed at once. This will send a
bipartisan message: Florida is no longer the home of red
tape and bureaucratic stagnation.

41. See APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, app. L, at 4-5.
42. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6) (1995).
43. Id.
44. See discussion infra pt. IV.B.
45. See APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, app. L, at n.6.
46. See, e.g., Governor Lawton Chiles's 1995 "State of the State" address to the Florida
Legislature, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 24-25 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 7, 1995). In that address, Governor Chiles
stated that by 1995, over 25,000 agency rules, including those adopted by Cabinet agencies,
were in force in Florida. Id.

47. Id. at 25.
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Let's make this great challenge one of our legacies for
Florida: to stop the insanity of rules and regulations; to start
the rule of common sense.48
In conjunction with his efforts to replace section 120.535 with "good
judgment and common sense" in government decisionmaking, Governor
Chiles ordered each executive branch agency to conduct a thorough
review of its rules and to take steps to repeal those rules which were
unreasonable, overly-precise, or otherwise unnecessary.49
The absence of rules to guide each agency decision provides
flexibility but also creates the potential for abuse of the discretion
implicit in this flexibility. In many respects, the flexibility sought for
agency decisionmaking is similar to the case-by-case policy development
authorized by McDonald and its progeny. In this regard, the 1996
amendments to the APA discussed in Part IV not only restrict incipient
policymaking by agencies but also attempt to ensure that agency
decisionmakers remain accountable to the public in the application of
the law through nonrule policies.
II.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE ATEMPTS TO ADDRESS AGENCY
POLICYMAKING THROUGH ADJUDICATION

Over the last several years, the Legislature has turned its attention to
reforming the APA in its entirety. These efforts began in earnest after
the 1993 Session when Representative Randy Mackey,' Chairman of
the Florida House of Representatives Select Committee on Agency
Rules and Administrative Procedures, established an APA Task Force
to recommend a proposal for APA reform to be considered during the
1994 Session.51 The Task Force was unable to formulate a consensus

48. Id. at 24, 25 (emphasis added).
49. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256 (July 12, 1995); Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-74 (Feb. 27,
1995). In response to this mandate, agencies repealed or noticed for repeal over 5000 rules in
1995; by June of 1996, they had repealed or noticed for repeal almost 50% of their rules. See
Rhea & Imhof, supra note 3, at 19. The 1996 Legislature codified a similar rule-review
requirement in § 120.74, Florida Statutes. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-399, § 46, at 2592.
50. Dem., Lake City.
51. Sally Bond Mann, Reforming the APA: Legislative Adventures in the Labyrinth, 22

FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307, 310-12 (1994). The Task Force was composed of a variety of
interested persons with expertise in the APA including legal scholars, private administrative law
practitioners, agency officials, administrative hearing officers, and judges from the First District
Court of Appeal. Id. at 311 n:21. For a more cynical view of the Task Force's composition and
focus, see Stephen T. Maher, Getting Into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 288-89 (1994);
David Gluckman, 1994 APA Legislation: The History, the Reasons, the Results, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 345, 346-47 (1994).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss1/3
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proposal, but the work product of the Task Force was incorporated into
a number of bills considered during the 1994 Session.5 2 None of those
bills addressed the issue of incipient policymaking by agencies.53 The
Legislature's work during the 1994 Session, however, set the stage for
the substantive revisions of the APA to be considered in the 1995 and
1996 Sessions. Many of the proposals considered in 1994 were
ultimately adopted in 1996 as part of CS/SBs 2290 & 2288.' 4
A. Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute

for Senate Bill 536 (1995)
As the 1995 Regular Session opened, it was clear that APA reform
would be a primary issue. As noted above, the Governor's "state of the
State" address had previously targeted the APA in general, and section
120.535 in particular, as "Public Enemy Number One" and urged
legislative action to reform the APA to make the state more attractive
to businesses." The Legislature responded and passed Committee
Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 536 (CS/CS/SB
536), which substantially revised the APA. 6 However, the Governor
vetoed this bill.
In place of section 120.535, CS/CS/SB 536 created section 120.547,
which provided that "[s]ensible and common sense government requires
At the same time, the Florida Senate Select Committee on Governmental Reform was created
to review agency rulemaking and governmental accountability. Gluckman, supra, at 347. The
chairman of that committee, Senator Charles Williams, became the spiritual leader of APA
reform in the Senate and was one of the prime sponsors of CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 in 1996. See
id.
52. See Mann, supra note 51, at 311-13.
53. See generally A Brief History of Selected APA Bills in the 1994 Session, 22 FLA. ST.

U. L. REV. 355 (1994). One bill amending the APA received legislative approval during 1994.
1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-161, § 1, at 954-55 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.58(l)(a)2.-3. (Supp.
1994)). That bill modified the APA's evidentiary provisions relating to similar fact evidence in
professional licensure and disciplinary proceedings. Id.
54. See Fla. CS/HB 237 (1994) (First Engrossed) (providing for rulemaking reform including a statement of estimated regulatory costs and eliminating the presumption of validity for
proposed rules); Fla. HB 569 (1994) (permitting the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
to temporarily suspend agency rules); Fla. HB 833 (1994) (providing for a summary hearing
procedure); Fla. SB 464 (1994) (authorizing an award of attorneys fees against an agency which
participates in an administrative proceeding for improper purposes); Fla. CS/CS/SB 536 (1995)
(Enrolled) (providing for rulemaking reform including a statement of estimated regulatory costs
and a summary hearing procedure).
55. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
56. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF SENATE BILLS at 68, SB 536.
57. Letter from Governor Lawton Chiles to Secretary of State Sandra Mortham (July 12,
1995) [hereinafter Governor's Veto Message].
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a balance between the circumstances that would require rulemaking and
the circumstances in which a case-by-case disposition is more appropriate. 58 While this language was consistent with the Governor's goal of
common sense decision making by agencies, section 120.547 went on
to provide that "[r]ulemaking is the preferred method of implementing
policy pursuant to a delegation of legislative authority. .. " and that
agencies are required to adopt their policies as rules under certain
circumstances. 9 The circumstances under which rulemaking would be
required by section 120.547 were almost identical to the "feasible" and
"practicable" standards set forth in section 120.535.' Thus, the repeal
of section 120.535 in CS/CS/SB 536 was one of form rather than
substance.61
Section 120.547 was not artfully drafted and left a number of
unanswered questions such as: Which party has the burden of proving
that one of the exceptions to rulemaking exist?6 2 Under what circumstances is a person entitled to attorneys' fees and costs where an agency
relies upon non-rule policy in determining the person's substantial
interests? 63 What must the agency demonstrate to "prove up" its
policies that are not yet required to be adopted as rules?' As discussed
below, the 1996 revisions to the APA answered these questions in such
a manner as not only perpetuates the substance of section 120.535, but
also may strengthen its remedies.

58. Fla. CS/CS/SB 536, § 10 (1995) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.547(1)).
59. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.547(1)-(2)) (emphasis added).
60. Compare id. with FLA. STAT. § 120.535(l)(a)-(b) (1995).
61. Governor's Veto Message, supra note 57, at 5. Indeed, the Governor noted that
"[u]nder the new [s]ection 120.547, the Administrative Procedure Act will continue to promote
the growth in the number of rules with which Floridians find themselves saddled today." Id.
(emphasis added).
62. Under § 120.535, the agency has the burden to prove that rulemaking is not feasible
and practicable. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(a)-(b) (1995).
63. CS/CS/SB 536 did not alter the provisions in § 120.535(6), which exempt agencies
from paying the attorneys' fees and costs of a person whose substantial interests are determined
by the agency's reliance on an unadopted rule if the agency initiated the rulemaking process to
adopt the statement as a rule. Thus, the remedy provided by the proposed § 120.547 was still
"weak." Maher, supra note 40, at 399. The 1996 amendments strengthen this remedy. See
discussion infra pt. IV.B.
64. Interestingly, the bill did not substantively amend § 120.57(1)(b)15., which allows an
agency to "prove up" a nonrule policy but provides no specific guidance for how an agency
should do so. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. By contrast, the 1996 revisions to
the APA specifically addressed the issues that the agency must "prove up" in order to rely on
an agency statement which has been determined to be an unadopted rule. Compare Fla.
CS/CS/SB 536, § 14 (1995) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)15.) with 1996
Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2. (Supp. 1996)).
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B. Governor's APA Review Commission
In an effort to thwart a potential override of his veto of CS/CS/SB
536, Governor Chiles established the Governor's Administrative
Procedure Act Review Commission (Commission). s The Commission
was composed of a variety of interested persons with expertise in the
APA, as well as several members of the Legislature.' The Governor
directed the Commission to perform a comprehensive review of the
APA and its current impact in light of the Governor's efforts to reduce
the number of rules and regulations used by state agencies and "to
'
restore common sense to government decisionmaking. 67
The Commission held six meetings between October 1995 and
February 1996.68 On February 20, 1996, the Commission issued its
final report which contained a number of recommendations for revising
the APA, including the retention of section 120.535 and the elimination
of any presumption of validity attaching to agency statements not
adopted as rules. 69 The Commission's recommendations served as the
basis for CS/SBs 2290 & 2288.70
In its recommendations, the Commission reaffirmed the need for
section 120.535 by noting that:
[Plublished rules help provide certainty to the regulated
community and also help inform the general public of an
agency's policies. The rulemaking process provides interested persons the opportunity to comment on proposed rules
and give necessary input to an agency as it develops its
policies.7

65. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256, § 7 (July 12, 1995).
66. See APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at i.
67. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256, § 7 (July 12, 1995); see also supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying teXt.
68. APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, Preface. See app. A-F for minutes of the
individual meetings.
69. Id. at 19, 23-24, 29-30.
70. Compare id, at 1-5 with discussion of CS/SBs 2290 & 2888, infra pt. IV. This Article
focuses only on the provisions of CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 relating to "incipient policymaking" by
agencies. For a discussion of other provisions of the bill, see generally Rhea & Imhof, supra
note 3; Lawrence E. Sellers, The Third Tune Is the Charm: Florida FinallyAdopts Rulemaking
Reform, 48 FLA. L. REV. 93 (1996); Donna E. Blanton & Robert M. Rhodes Loosening the
Chains That Bind: The New Variance and Waiver Provision in Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 353 (1997); F Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks on
Rulemaking Under the New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309 (1997).
71. APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 19.
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The Commission concluded that the rulemaking mandate implicit in
section 120.535 is not the cause of the perceived problem with section
120.535; instead, the Commission suggested that those perceived
problems result from overly rigid rules adopted by some agencies.7"
Apparently, the Commission concluded that it is this rigidity which
prevents the agency from exercising "good judgment and common
sense" in the application of its rules.73
Implicit in its recommendation to retain section 120.535 was a
recognition that in some circumstances agencies must have flexibility to
sharpen their policies through adjudication. The Commission recommended that when an agency relies on a non-rule policy in an adjudicatory proceeding, the policy should not receive a presumption of validity.
that the agency should have the
Rather, the Commission reaffirmed
74
burden to "prove up" the policy.
IV. CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 (1996)
On its face, CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 seems to achieve one of the
Governor's long-standing goals, that is, repeal section 120.535."
However, the substantive provisions of that section have not been
eliminated from the law, but merely have relocated to other sections as
part of the bill's "simplification" of Chapter 120. Moreover, amendments to former sections 120.535 and 120.57(1)(b)15. may restrict
"incipient policymaking" by agencies even more. Another provision of
the bill offers regulated parties a non-adversarial procedure through
which they can petition an agency to adopt an unadopted rule or policy
through the rulemaking process.
A. The New Section 120.54(7): "ForcedRulemaking"?
Under existing law, any regulated person may petition an agency to
adopt or repeal a rule.76 The agency, however, has great discretion to
grant or deny such a petition. 7 So long as rulemaking is not required

72. Id.
73. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256, at 2 (July 12, 1995), in which Governor Chiles
stated that one problem with the APA is that it "deprives agency decisionmakers of the ability
to exercise good judgment and common sense."
74. APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24.
75. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 8, at 159; see also supra text accompanying note 48.

76.

FLA. STAT.

§ 120.54(5) (1995).

77. Citizens of Florida v. Mayo, 357 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1978); Rhea v. School Bd. of
Alachua County, 616 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Freeman v. Department of Health &
Rehab. Servs., 436 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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by the enabling statute,7 8 and the agency states "with particularity"7 9
the reasons for its decision, a reviewing court will not reverse the
agency's decision not to adopt a rule."0
CS/SBs 2288 & 2290 retains this provision. The bill also creates
a separate procedure by which a regulated party may petition the agency
to initiate rulemaking of an "existing rule which the agency has not
adopted by the rulemaking procedures or requirements" of the APA 2
As discussed below, an agency may not deny petitions to initiate
rulemaking directed at an unadopted rule as freely as it may under the
former section 120.54(5).
This is not to say that the agency's decision on the petition is not
vested with agency discretion. Nothing in paragraphs (7)(b) or (7)(c) in
the new section 120.54 requires the agency to grant the petition and
initiate rulemaking. 3 The agency only is required to follow the notice
and hearing procedures set forth in paragraphs (7)(b) and (7)(c)." Thus,
a court reviewing and agency's denial of a petition directed at an
unadopted rule may defer to the agency's exercise of its discretion based
on Citizens of Florida v. Mayo" and its progeny. 6 On the other hand,
it is arguable that if the record of the public hearing required by section
120.54(7)(b) indicates that the adoption of the unadopted rule is
"feasible and practicable," a reviewing court may conclude that the
agency was required by statute, particularly the new section 120.54(l)(a)
which mandates that agency policies be adopted as soon as feasible and
practicable, to adopt the policy as a rule and is without discretion to
refuse to initiate rulemaking. 7 Alternatively, the failure to initiate
rulemaking in such a circumstance may be considered an abuse of the
agency's discretion.
Under this new provision, the agency must either initiate rulemaking
or provide notice that the agency will hold a public hearing on the
78. Mayo, 357 So. 2d at 733.
79. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-3.013(2) (1987).
80. See generally George L. Waas, Initiating Agency Action: Petitionsfor Declaratory
Statement and Rulemaking Under the FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct, 55 FLA. B.J. 43
(Jan. 1981).
81. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 10, at 170 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(7)(a) (Supp.
1996)).
82. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(7)(b)-(c) (Supp. 1996)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 357 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1978) (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5)).
86. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 77.
87. See Bayonet Point Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 490 So. 2d
1318, 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (stating that a court may substitute its judgment for that of an
agency under § 120.54(5) where the adoption of the requested rule was mandated by statute).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

petition within thirty days after the petition is filed.8" The public
hearing must be held within thirty days after the notice is published. 9
The purpose of the public hearing is to receive and consider public comments on the unadopted rule, "and to consider whether the public
interest is served adequately by the application of the rule on a case-bycase basis, as contrasted with its adoption by the rulemaking procedures
or requirements [of the APA]."' Stated another way, the purpose of
the public hearing is to determine whether the agency's policy has
evolved to the extent that it should be formally adopted by the agency
as a rule.
Within thirty days after the public hearing, the agency must either
initiate rulemaking or issue a statement of its reasons for not initiating
rulemaking.9' This statement must be published in the FloridaAdministrative Weekly and must be filed with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC).9 JAPC must forward this statement to the
legislative committee with primary oversight of the agency for its
review.93 That legislative committee may hold a hearing and may
recommend to introduce legislation to make the unadopted rule a
statutory standard, or to limit or modify the authority of the agency. 94
While an agency is not required to grant each petition directed at an
unadopted rule, the procedure set forth above is designed to "encourage"
agencies to grant such petitions in most instances. 95 In fact, when this
new provision is read in conjunction with JAPC's additional authority
to recommend the suspension of an existing rule, 96 it seems agencies
have little choice but to adopt their policies as rules. In this regard, this
new provision is consistent with the language from former section
120.535(1) which provides that "[rlulemaking is not a matter of agency

88. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 95-159, § 10, at 170 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(7)(b) (Supp.
1996)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(7)(c) (Supp. 1996)).
92. Id. JAPC is a joint committee of the Legislature whose purpose is to ensure that
executive agencies remain accountable to the Legislature by adopting rules consistent with and
within the authority delegated to the agency. See FLA. STAT. §§ 11.60, 120.545 (1995); see also
Boyd, supra note 70 (regarding legislative checks on rulemaking in general).
93. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 10, at 170 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(7)(c) (Supp.
1996)).
94. Id.

95. Any legal discretion that an agency has to deny a petition directed at an unadopted
rule is limited by political pressure to initiate rulemaking from the JAPC and from legislative
review of the agency's decisions.
96. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 14, at 176-77 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(10)
(Supp. 1996)).
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discretion[,]" and requires agencies to adopt their policies as rules as
soon as "feasible and practicable."97
In essence, the Legislature has created another, but less adversarial,
procedure by which an affected party may request an agency to formally
adopt its developed policies as rules. However, because the agency may
have some degree of discretion to choose not to formally adopt as a rule
the policy that is the subject of the petition, this procedure may not
provide an affected party with a satisfactory remedy. The agency
remains free to rely on the unadopted rule to determine the party's
substantial interests, subject to the requirements of the new section
120.57(1)(e). Further, an affected party who successfully convinces the
agency to adopt the policy as a rule without prevailing in a proceeding
before a hearing officer is not independently entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees and costs.98 Thus, the remedy offered by this new
procedure is somewhat similar to that in the former section 120.535-it
can be used to force an agency into rulemaking but little more.99
B. Revisions to the Former Section 120.535
As discussed above, CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 repeals section 120.535
and relocates its provisions to other sections of the APA. The legislative
preference for policymaking through rulemaking is retained. Agencies
must still adopt their policies as rules as soon as "feasible and practicable."'' " In addition, the procedure for challenging an agency statement
defined as a rule but not formally adopted through the rulemaking
process remains substantially unchanged.' ° '
CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 does, however, amend the former section
120.535 in several material respects. These amendments strengthen the
remedy in the former section 120.535'" and clarify the limits on the
97. This language has been moved to § 120.54(l)(a). See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, §
10, at 161 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(l)(a) (Supp. 1996)).
98. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 25, at 196 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(a)
(Supp. 1996)) (awarding attorneys' fees and costs only "[u]pon entry of a final order [by an
administrative law judge] that all or part of an agency statement violates § 120.54(1)(a)).
99. Maher, supra note 40, at 399, 402-05. Professor Maher's comments as to the limited
usefulness of § 120.535, standing alone, would seem equally applicable to the new procedure
in § 120.54(7)(b)-(c). Thus, the new procedure is useful only to persons who "have a long-term
interest in codifying an area of agency policy, such as those who are subjected to that policy
repeatedly over time." Id. at 402.
100. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 10, at 160-61 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(l)(a)
(Supp. 1996)).
101. Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)-(3) (1995) with 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 16,
at 182-83 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(4)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1996)).
102. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 25, at 196 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(a)
(Supp. 1996)) (providing an award of attorneys' fees and costs against the agency if the agency
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exercise of incipient policymaking by agencies." 3 Furthermore,
CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 specifically provides for an award of attorneys'
fees and costs to a person who successfully challenges an agency's
failure to formally adopt a policy as a rule."°4 This amendment is a
direct result of the criticism of the former section 120.535, which
allowed an agency to avoid payment of attorneys' fees and costs simply
by initiating the rulemaking process. 5 As in section 120.535,
attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this provision are payable from the
budget of the secretary, or other equivalent officer, of the agency."
By shifting the costs of challenging the agency's failure to adopt its
policies as rules from the affected party to the agency, and more
slecifically, to the agency head's budget, the Legislature has created
another incentive for agencies to adopt their policies as rules at an
earlier stage. Thus, where an agency policy is truly evolving or
incipient, the agency retains the discretion to sharpen the policy through
adjudication. However, as soon as the agency believes that it is "feasible
and practicable" to do so, it will be well advised to initiate rulemaking
proceedings to codify the policy.
The agency can still avoid payment of attorneys' fees and costs by
initiating the rulemaking process after a challenge to its policy has been
filed pursuant to the new section 120.56(4) but before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)'" issues a final order on the challenge.'0 8
Once rulemaking is initiated, the challenge is essentially moot."° If,
however, the ALJ enters a final order determining that the agency
is unable to demonstrate that rulemaking is not feasible and practicable).
103. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 16, at 183 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(4)(e) (Supp.
1996)); see also 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187-88 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(e) (Supp. 1996)); see discussion infra pt. IV.C.
104. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 25, at 196 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(a)
(Supp. 1996)). This provision was amended during the 1997 Regular Session as part of an APA
"glitch" bill which became effective on May 29, 1997. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-176, § 11, at
2063-64 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(a) (1997)). Now, the agency is not liable
for attorneys' fees if it "demonstrates that the statement is required by the Federal Government
to implement or retain a delegated program or meet a condition to receipt of federal ftnds." Id.
105. Maher, supra note 40, at 399; see also FLA. STAT. § 120.535(5), (6) (1995).
106. Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6) (1995) with 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 25, at
197 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(b) (Supp. 1996)).
107. CS/SBs 2290 & 2288 redesignates the hearing officers at the Division of Administrative Hearings as "administrative law judges." 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 31, at 199 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 120.65(4).(Supp. 1996)).
108. APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
109. That the agency is engaged in the rulemaking process to adopt rules which address the
statement is sufficient to overcome its burden of demonstrating that rulemaking is not "feasible."
1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 10, at 160 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a)l.c. (Supp.
1996)).
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should have formally adopted its policy as a rule, the agency must
immediately discontinue reliance on that policy or any substantially
similar policy as a basis for agency action"' and must pay the
petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs."' This requirement serves as an
incentive for the agency to formally adopt its policies as rules either
prior to or during a challenge to the policy. If the agency falls to do so,
and then does not prevail in the subsequent proceeding, it not only must
pay the attorneys' fees and costs of the challenger, but also may not
apply the policy to the challenger or any other person.
In some circumstances, the latter restriction on an agency's reliance
on its policy may be very troublesome. For example, if an agency denies
a permit based solely upon an uncodified interpretation of its enabling
legislation (i.e., the policy), and the agency's failure to adopt this policy
as a rule is determined to be a violation of section 120.54(1)(a), the
agency could no longer use that policy as a basis for denying permits.
Until rules codifying this policy are proposed and become effective, all
applicants that otherwise meet the statutory requirements for the permit
would be entitled to the permit. In other words, there would be a period
of time in which the agency may be "helpless" to deny permits
notwithstanding its interpretation of its enabling statute. This possibility
alone may encourage agencies to initiate rulemaking to codify the
policy.
Accordingly, it seems likely that agencies will choose to adopt their
policies as rules in most circumstances. Thus, these amendments should
achieve the policy goal that the Legislature intended when section
120.535 was originally enacted in 1991.2 Only when it is clear that
the agency policy is still developing (i.e., rulemaking is not "feasible
and practicable") can an agency afford to rely on an unadopted rule in
determining a person's substantial interests. In addition, the Legislature
clarified the factors that an agency must "prove up" when it does rely
on a non-rule policy.'

110. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 16, at 183 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(4)(d) (Supp.
1996)).
111. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 25, at 196 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.595(4)(a)

(Supp. 1996)).
112. Dore, supra note 18, at 448 (stating that § 120.535 reflected the Legislature's
"judgment that rulemaking is required to all instances when it is feasible and practicable"); see
also APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 18, app. L, at 1-2 (same).
113. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187-88 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.
(Supp. 1996)) (listing the factors that an agency must demonstrate to the administrative law
judge to prove its nonrule policy is valid); see also discussion infra pt. IV.C (same).
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C. The New Section 120.57(1)(e): Additional
Restrictions on Agency Policymaking
Through Adjudication
The McDonald court noted that if an agency chooses to develop its
non-rule policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking, it must
"prove up" the policy each time that it is applied."' This requirement
was codified in 1991 in section 120.57(1)(b)15."' That section required the agency to demonstrate that the policy being applied is "within
the scope of delegated legislative authority."".6 The 1996 amendments
to the APA further clarify what the agency must demonstrate to "prove
up" its policy.117 The 1996 amendments also restrict the agency's
ability to overturn the 118AL's decision as to whether the agency has
"proved up" the policy.
When an agency relies on an unadopted rule. 9 to determine a
person's substantial interests, the agency's action is not presumed to be
valid or invalid," and the ALJ is not required to give any deference
to the agency's interpretation of its enabling statute.' In each case the
agency must demonstrate that the unadopted rule:

114. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 582; see also Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1182.
115. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-30, § 4, at 246 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15.
(1995)).
116. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15. (1995).
117. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.
(Supp. 1996)).
118. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)3. (Supp. 1996)) (allowing an agency to
reject the decision of the administrative law judge only if the decision is "clearly erroneous or
does notcomply with essential requirements of law").
119. Arguably, the Legislature's use of the phrase "unadopted rule" in § 120.57(1)(e) was
intended to limit the applicability of the provisions of that paragraph to agency statements which
meet the definition of a rule but which have not been codified as such. Under this interpretation,
the provisions of § 120.57(1)(e) would be inapplicable to true "incipient policies" since those
policies are typically not yet "statements of general applicability" and therefore are not rules.
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1995) (defining "rule"); McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 580-83. The authors
are unaware of anything in the legislative history of the 1996 APA amendments to support that
interpretation. Moreover, had the Legislature intended this result, it would have used language
to that effect as it did in the new § 120.54(1)(a). 1996 Fla. Laws, ch. 96-159, § 10, at 160-61
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(I)(a) (Supp. 1996)); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.535(1),
.57(1)(b)15. (1995). Because it failed to do so, the authors contend that the Legislature's use of
the phrase "unadopted rule" is intended to refer to all non-rule policies, including "incipient
policies."
120. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)2.
(Supp. 1996)); see also APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, app. N, at 20-30.
121. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 186-90 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)-(2)(b)
(Supp. 1996)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss1/3

18

Hopping and Wetherell: The Legislature Tweaks McDonald (Again): The New Restrictions on
NEW RESTRICTIONS IN APA

a. Is within the powers, functions, and duties delegated by
the Legislature or, if the agency is operating pursuant to
authority derived from the State Constitution, is within
that authority;
b. Does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific
provisions of law implemented;
c. Is not vague, establishes adequate standards for agency
decisions, or does not vest unbridled discretion in the
agency;
d. Is not arbitrary or capricious;
e. Is not being applied to the substantially affected party
without due notice;
f. Is supported by substantial competent evidence; and
g. Does not impose excessive regulatory costs on the
regulated person, county or city."
In most respects, these criteria are identical to those in section
120.52(8), which defines an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority.""I Therefore, the agency essentially has the burden to prove
that its policy is not an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority." Moreover, because this list uses the conjunction "and" rather
than "or," the agency must demonstrate that its policy satisfies all of

122. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.a.-g. (Supp. 1996)) (emphasis added).
123. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1995) defines an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority" as
action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the
Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply:
(a) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking
procedures set forth in s. 120.54;
(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to
which is required by s. 120.54(7);
(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law
implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);
(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions,
or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or
(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.
Id.; see also 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 3, at 151-52 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)
(Supp. 1996)).
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these criteria. 24 If it fails to do so, the agency fails to "prove up" the
policy and may not rely on it."
Because the criteria listed above are taken from section 120.52(8),
it is expected that courts will interpret those provisions in para materia.
Several of these criteria, however, are new and may make it more
difficult for agencies to develop their policies through adjudication. In
particular, subsubparagraphs e, f and g will require agencies to take
additional care in formulating their policy, especially when an interpretation is being made for the first time.
Subsubparagraph e provides that an agency must demonstrate that the
unadopted rule is not 26being applied to a substantially affected party
"without due notice."' This provision was derived from a line of
recent federal decisions in which an agency policy was being applied in
licensing and enforcement decisions.'27 The theory underlying these
decisions and subsubparagraph e is that if an agency's interpretation of
its enabling statute (i.e., the agency policy) is unclear or does not
logically and obviously follow from the enabling statute, the regulated
party cannot be "on notice" of the policy." As such, the agency
should not be permitted to rely on the policy when determining a
person's substantial interests.
In essence, this provision requires that an agency's policy be
developed to such an extent in the agency's previous final orders that

124. Compare 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187-88 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(e)2.a.-g. (Supp. 1996)) with FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1995). Because the § 120.52(8)
list uses the term "or" rather than "and," a challenger must only demonstrate that the rule or
proposed rule violates one of the criteria. Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 365
So. 2d 759, 762-63 (1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979). But see Grove Isle,
Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 454 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (holding that a
challenger must prove all of the criteria); Department of Admin. v. Albanese, 445 So. 2d 639,
641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (same).
125. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 187-88 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.
(Supp. 1996)).
126. Id. at 187 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.e. (Supp. 1996)).
127. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 53 F3d 1324, 133334 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Where, as here, the regulations and other policy statements are unclear...
and where the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive reading of the regulatory
requirements, a regulatory party is not 'on notice' of the agency's ultimate interpretation of the
regulations, and may not be punished."); United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556,
559 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a regulated person is not "on notice!' of an agency's
interpretation of a regulation, such that the agency may sanction the entity for violations of the
regulation based on the interpretation, when the "agency has not formulated an official interpretation of its regulation"). By definition, "incipient policies" are still evolving. Thus, an agency
relying on incipient policy does not have a "solidified" interpretation. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at
582.
128. See supra note 127.
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regulated parties will have notice of the policy before it is applied to
them. Where the agency's policy has been developing over a period of
time and the agency's position has almost solidified to the point of
codifying the policy through rulemaking, this criterion should be easy
to satisfy.'29 However, when the agency applies the policy for the first
time or changes its policy in mid-stream, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, for the agency to demonstrate that affected parties have "due
notice" of the policy. Thus, when an agency applies a policy for the first
time, it must demonstrate that its interpretation of the enabling statute
is sufficiently obvious that all substantially affected parties are implicitly
on notice of the policy."3
Subsubparagraphf, which is somewhat related to subsubparagraph e,
requires the unadopted rule to be "supported by competent and
substantial evidence.'' Stated another way, the record before the ALJ
must demonstrate the factual and legal basis for the agency's policy.'32
The agency must create a record foundation supporting the "accuracy of
every factual premise and the rationality of every policy choice."'3
This provision is similar to, but more expansive than, the language in
the old section 120.57(l)(b)15., which required that recommended and
final orders include an explanation of the policy statement identifying
the "evidentiary basis" of the statement 34
Subsubparagraph g requires the agency to demonstrate that the policy
"does not impose excessive regulatory costs on the" affected party. 35
However, this provision does not specify the yardstick by which
129. In fact, McDonald is premised partially on the fact that an agency would retain "an
ever-expanding library of [its] precedents" available for public inspection. McDonald, 346 So.
2d at 583.
130. The authors suggest that this standard should also apply where the agency's non-rule
policy is an extension of an agency rule to a circumstance not directly addressed or anticipated
by the rule. Cf. Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1181 ("The model of responsible agency action
under the APA is action faithful to statutory purposes and limitations, foretold to the public as
fully as practicable by substantive rules, and refined and adapted to particular situations through
orders in individual cases.") (emphasis added).

131. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)2.f.
(Supp. 1996)).
132. See City of Delray Beach v. Department of Transp., 456 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1984) (holding that a non-rule policy must "find a predicate in the record [and] adequately
address the evidence presented to explicate its decision"); see also Florida League of Cities, Inc.
v. Administrative Comm'n, 586 So. 2d 397, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that an agency
may apply nonrule policy provided "any ultimate use [of the policy] by the agency is supported
by competent substantial evidence").
133. Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 1182.
134. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)15. (1995).
135. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)2.g.
(Supp. 1996)).
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excessiveness is to be measured. Section 120.541, which relates to the
statement of excessive regulatory costs (SERC), also does not provide
any significant guidance, although it does identify certain costs which
may result from the agency's policy and which therefore may be
excessive.'36
The determination as to the "excessiveness" of the costs imposed by
a policy is likely a factual issue to be decided by an AL. As such, the
affected party should be permitted to offer evidence relating to specific
costs, such as "transactional costs," which may be excessive. It is
important to note, however, that under section 120.57(1)(e)2.g. the
agency is not necessarily required to disprove the existence of a lowercost alternative.137 The agency must only demonstrate that the costs
those party-specific transactional
imposed by the agency, including
38
costs, are not "excessive."'1

Not only may section 120.57(1)(e) make it more difficult for an
agency to "prove up" its policies before an ALJ, but also it dramatically
restricts the agency's ability in its final order to reject the ALl's
conclusion that the agency failed to "prove up" the policy.'3 9 The
agency may only reject the ALJ's determination where it is "clearly
erroneous or does not comply with the essential requirements of
law."' If, on appeal, the court determines that the agency's rejection
of the ALJ decision does not comply with this provision, the agency
action will be set aside, and the court will award attorneys' fees and
costs to the prevailing party.' 4 '
136. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 11, at 171-72 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.541 (Supp.
1996)). Specifically, this section defines certain "transactional costs" which may be incurred by
parties affected by a proposed rule. Id. § 11, at 172 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.541(2)(c)
(Supp. 1996)). These costs include items such as the cost of equipment required to be installed
or used, procedures required to be employed in complying with the rule, and the cost of required
monitoring or reporting. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the SERC, see Sellers, supra note 70,
at [Sections M.G.-M.H.].
137. Cf. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 3, at 152 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(g)
(Supp. 1996)) (including, as a criterion for invalidating a proposed or existing rule, whether the
rule imposes regulatory costs "which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives
that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives").
138. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)2.g.
(Supp. 1996)).
139. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)3. (Supp. 1996)).
140. Id.
141. Id. The prevailing party is entitled to the attorneys' fees and costs for both the appeal
and the underlying proceeding. Id. Such an award is consistent with the awards authorized under
the new § 120.595(2) (providing for awards when a proposed rule is held invalid by an AL)
and § 120.595(5) (authorizing awards when an agency improperly rejects or modifies an ALU's
findings of fact). Unlike those sections, however, the new § 120.57(1)(e)3. does not cap an
award of attorneys' fees and costs at $15,000.
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Because the hearing officer's determination as to the validity of the
agency policy is typically treated as a legal conclusion under current
law, the agency is free to reject or modify the hearing officer's
determination. 42 Under the new section 120.57(1)(e)3., this determination is essentially treated as a separate and distinct "order" within the
context of the adjudicatory administrative proceeding in which the
policy is being applied." In other words, this provision may require
that each proceeding in which an agency relies on a non-rule policy be
"bifurcated" into a determination as to the validity of the policy and, if
the policy is valid, an adjudication as to the propriety of the application
of that policy to the person's substantial interests.
An AL's determination as to the validity of the policy is something
less than a final order but more than a mere conclusion of law.'"
When viewed in this light, the legislative policy underlying section
120.57(l)(e)3. is now more consistent with its treatment of the AL's
determination in administrative challenges to proposed and existing
rules.'45 By not giving the ALJ final order authority, however, the
Legislature acknowledged that in some circumstances an agency should
be given an opportunity to modify the AL's decision as to the validity
of the agency policy. These circumstances are limited, however, to those
where the AL's determination is "clearly erroneous or does not comply
with [the] essential requirements of law."'" This standard essentially
places the agency in the position of an appellate court reviewing the
ALJ's determination, and it is intended to authorize modification or
substitution of that determination only in the most egregious cases.

142. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10. (1995). Even if the issue is treated as a factual issue or
a mixed question of law and fact, the agency is relatively free to reject the hearing officer's
determination. See McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 579 (reviewing court will give greater deference
to agency's substituted finding where such finding is infused with policy considerations).
143. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159, § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)3.
(Supp. 1996)). This provision creates a different standard for an agency's review of various
findings and conclusions in an ALI's recommended order. Id. As to the AL's determination of
the validity of the agency's policy, the agency's review and final order are governed by the new
§ 120.57(1)(e)3. The agency's review of the remainder of the ALI's recommended order is
governed by the new § 120.57(1)(j). To facilitate the agency's review and any subsequent
judicial review, it may be helpful for AIJs to bifurcate the proceeding or at least present the
issues separately in their recommended orders.
144. The Commission considered giving ALJs final order authority in all administrative
adjudicatory proceedings, but it decided not to include this issue in its final recommendations.
APA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, app. R, at 36; see also supra note 15.
145. ALs have final order authority in cases involving challenges to existing rules,
proposed rules, and agency statements under the former § 120.535. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-159,
§ 16, at 181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1)(e) (Supp. 1996)).
146. Id. § 19, at 188 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)3. (Supp. 1996)).
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This limit on an agency's ability to reject or modify the AL's
decision under section 120.57(l)(e) further reflects the policy choice by
the Legislature that agency policies should be developed through the
rulemaking process rather than the adjudicatory process. Where an
agency chooses the latter, it must be prepared to defend its policy before
an impartial third party, an AL. If the agency is unable to demonstrate
to the ALJ that its policy is valid, it may not rely on the policy, just as
it may not rely on a proposed rule which is successfully challenged
under the new section 120.56(2).
V. CONCLUSION

The 1996 amendments to the APA reflect the most comprehensive
revision to the text of the APA since its enactment in 1974. It remains
to be seen whether these amendments will result in any dramatic change
in the way state agencies deal with regulated parties. As discussed in
this Article, these amendments reaffirm the Legislature's commitment
to agency policymaking by rulemaking rather than by case-by-case
adjudication. By restricting incipient policymaking by agencies and
encouraging agencies to formally adopt their polices as rules, the revised
APA should provide for renewed predictability in government
decisionmaking.
It is important to remember, however, that this effort to combat
"phantom government" is part of a greater revision to the administrative
process. In particular, this effort must be viewed in light of the new
waiver and variance provisions included in section 120.542.147 Any
increase in the number of agency rules resulting from the new
"rulemaking mandates" discussed in this Article should not cause the
same morass of regulations that prompted Governor Chiles to call for
the repeal of section 120.535. In this regard, any increase in the number
of rules should be offset by the agency's ability to exercise "good
judgment and common sense" in applying these rules. To this end, the
1996 amendments, as a whole, reflect a legislative determination that the
success of the APA should be judged not by the number of administrative rules that exist, but by the way in which the rules are applied.

147. For an in-depth discussion of this new provision, see Blanton & Rhodes, supra note
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